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1. Three Kinds of Normativity? 
Kripke (1982: 37) famously contrasts norms with mere 
dispositions: although the manifest dispositions of a 
person can tell us what she thought the right way of 
following a rule was, they cannot point to what she should 
have done. This implies that to be normative, the meaning 
of a term must have consequences for how we should use 
it. My concern is not the sceptical problem of how there 
can be meaning-facts in the first place, but what sense can 
be made of the claim that meanings have nromative 
consequences for use. I start by examining three cases, 
and asking which, if any, is analogical to speaking a 
language.  
Imagine a person who, descending from her apartment, 
invents a rule for which stairs one can step on. To engage 
in this activity, one should try not to step on certain stairs, 
but even a person making mistakes can be said to be 
playing the game. Compare this with chess. The rules of 
chess are constitutive in the sense that a failure to follow 
them is a failure to play chess, but of course, making 
legitimate moves is not a sufficient condition for playing, at 
least not for playing well. To contrast these games with a 
third example, imagine that a staircase is defective so that 
certain stairs collapse when stepped on. If someone wants 
to get to the apartment on the highest floor, and there is no 
other way of getting there, we would say that one should 
not step on certain stairs, but this ‘norm’ is not arbitrary as 
in the two games: someone who moves the king like the 
queen is not playing chess, but we can always stipulate a 
new game which is defined by this move (see Wittgenstein 
1974: X, 133). Compare these examples with using words. 
Obviously, being understood by others sets limits to the 
utterances we can make, but does this imply that it is a 
norm to use a word in accordance with its meaning, or that 
there are some further obligations to speak in ways that 
are ‘semantically correct’?  
An obvious suggestion concerning the normativity of 
meaning is provided by Paul Boghossian (1989: 513): it is 
“simply a new name for the familiar fact that, regardless of 
whether one thinks of meaning in truth-theoretic or 
assertion-theoretic terms, meaningful expressions possess 
conditions of correct use”. There need not be any 
convention or norm dictating what particular words can be 
used to mean, since this condition simply requires that if, 
at a certain time, ‘green’ means green, it is correctly 
applicable only to those things that are green (ibid.). On 
this picture, then, normativity is a name for the fact that 
uses can be categorized into correct and incorrect ones. 
The problem with this account is that we can always ask 
why we should apply ‘green’ to green things. As Kathrin 
Glüer (2001: 60) remarks, it is far from clear that a 
condition of semantic correctness providing means for 
categorizing utterances into true and false, or justified and 
unjustified ones, has any normative consequences for the 
use of a term.  
A conditional stating that unless I use a word correctly, it 
cannot have the meaning I intend, would have action-
guiding force akin to the rules of chess. The following 
conditional might serve this purpose: 
A speaker s can mean green by ‘green’ (or any other 
word) at t iff she applies ‘green’ only to those things that 
are green.  
There is also a stronger picture of the normativity of 
language, on which words carry certain meanings and 
conditions of correctness with them. Roughly, the idea is 
that languages are governed by rules, and speaking a 
certain language demands grasping these rules and 
applying them correctly. Dummett (1986, 473–474) 
expresses this idea when he insists that there are 
conventions governing what meanings words have in a 
language, and these meanings are independent of the 
intentions of particular speakers.  
Both of these views are primarily concerned with se-
mantic rather than syntactic correctness. Semantic 
correctness, on the second picture, is a result of two 
factors. When applying a word correctly, I both apply the 
right word and make the right judgment about reality. But 
on any plausible conception of meaning, failing to apply a 
word correctly does not imply failing to mean something by 
it: I can claim that the grass outside is green when, in 
reality, it is yellow or brown, and still mean green by ‘green’ 
(cf. Glüer 2001: 61; Bilgrami 1993: 143). Hence, in 
individual cases, succeeding to apply ‘green’ to green 
things is not constitutive of being able to mean green by 
‘green’, as castling correctly is constitutive of playing 
chess.  
Davidson rejects the second, Dummettian picture of 
meaning normativity on the grounds that using words in 
accordance with their standard meanings is not essential 
for communication. Avoiding broken stairs may be 
necessary for getting to highest floor of an apartment 
building, but doing so is not constitutive of the goal: it is not 
as if we could give no content to it except in terms of the 
broken staircase, as we can’t give content to the idea of 
playing chess except in terms of the rules of chess. 
Davidson (1994: 11) insists that the whole point of 
language is communication, being understood, and any 
philosophically interesting norm has to spring from this 
goal. The same critique can be extended to the weaker 
picture of meaning normativity: it is possible to use an 
expression no-one has ever used, incorrectly, and still be 
understood.  
But just as one has to at least try not to step on certain 
stairs to play the stair-game, is trying to use words 
correctly, in accordance with their meaning, constitutive for 
meaning something by a word? It is difficult to deny that 
semantic correctness – whether understood in terms of 
truth- or justification-conditions – is constitutive of mean-
ing: if ‘green’ correctly applied to objects that are green 
before 2005 and yellow after, it would not mean green. 
This need not present a problem, as long as we distinguish 
having a meaning and meaning something by a word. 
Davidson seems to think that only something constitutive 
of the latter could have any normative, deontological force. 
He offers a conditional along the following lines:  
(D) A speaker s can mean green by ‘green’ at t iff she is 
justified in believing that she will be understood as 




meaning green by ‘green’, and speaks with the intention 
of being so understood. (Cf. Davidson 1994: 12).1 
The demand that one need merely to produce utterances 
that are interpretable, and be justified in believing this, is 
best seen as a constitutive criterion for having a language. 
But Davidson also gives an externalist account of 
conditions that must be satisfied for an individual to meet 
this criterion.2 Moreover, he acknowledges that successful 
communication is grounded by numerous empirical con-
straints, for the speaker must be aware of a whole nexus 
of factors underlying the possibility of being understood in 
particular cases. Among these is knowledge of the literal 
meanings of one’s words – that is, their ‘normal’ conditions 
of semantic correctness – knowledge of one’s hearer or 
interpreter, and regularity or consistency on the part of the 
speaker (see Davidson 1986: 442–443). However, David-
son (2001b: 297) holds that there is nothing essentially 
normative about the constraints mentioned – they are 
perfectly analogical with the constraint of avoiding broken 
stairs to climb a staircase.  
2. Conflicting Norms? 
In addition to (D), Davidson is committed to the following 
two theses. In this section I try to resolve what at first sight 
seems like a tension between them and (D). 
(E) It is possible to think of and refer to something, e.g. 
water, only against a causal history of relations to water. 
(W) Consciousness of the norm between semantically 
correct and incorrect use is prerequisite for having a 
language, and it demands that one go on as before. 
The tension results from the fact that, on the one hand, (D) 
states that semantic correctness is not a norm for meaning 
something by a word. Moreover, regularity or consistency 
in the use of a word, or going on as before, is merely an 
empirical constraint on understanding. On the other, (E) 
implies that semantic correctness – a history of correct 
application and awareness of the truth conditions of one’s 
words – is constitutive of meaning water by ‘water’, and 
(W) states the necessity of going on as before. At least 
there is nothing prima facie contradictory about a situation 
where these two sets of norms conflict. I will argue that the 
contradiction is resolved by noting that (E) and (W) are 
built into the possibility of intending to mean green by 
‘green’.  
Despite his commitment to (D), Davidson (1994: 10) 
wants to engage in the enterprise of drawing the “distinc-
tion Wittgenstein has made central to the study of 
meaning, the distinction between using words correctly 
and merely thinking one is using them correctly”. The idea 
is that the only possible check for using a word correctly is 
provided by realizing that my use of an expression is 
similar to your use of another expression, and this, of 
course, demands a pattern of regularity (see Davidson 
1993, 118–119). This need not conflict with the idea that 
using a word as before is not a norm, as long as we 
distinguish between a child learning her earliest, basic 
sentences, and adult speakers. Nevertheless, we cannot 
                                                     
1 Davidson (1994: 13) remarks that it is a necessary condition of meaning 
something that there are “endless cases of successful communication”, which 
of course does not follow directly from (D). Moreover, he (ibid.) makes the 
qualification that “there must be people who would understand the speaker as 
he intends, and the speaker reasonably believes he is speaking to such a 
person”.  
2 It seems to me that one can accept the public criterion without accepting 
Davidson’s (partly) social views of what communication presupposes (I have in 
mind mainly the idea of triangulation and the intrinsically social nature of 
language it implies). But I will not argue for this point here.  
escape the fact that according to (W), awareness of 
conditions of correct use is essential for meaning. 
The gist of Davidson’s externalism is that in basic, 
observational cases, what we apply a concept to – what 
causes us to assent to a word or utterance – determines 
its content. Because the relevant, content-endowing cause 
is individuated in a triangular situation, built in with 
awareness, on the part of the triangulating beings, of the 
shared cause, knowledge of what our words refer to in 
basic cases is guaranteed. Davidson most explicitly 
applies this idea to radical interpretation, which is possible 
precisely because “the situations which normally cause a 
belief determine the conditions in which it is true” (David-
son 2001a: 197). Essentially the same holds for first 
acquiring a concept. Correct application is tied together 
with having a concept or meaning something by a word, 
since “we do not first form concepts and then discover 
what they apply to” (Davidson 2001a: 196). But Davidson’s 
externalism reaches beyond the earliest stages of 
language-acquisition: he approves Burge’s idea that 
generally, what makes it possible for a person to mean 
something by ‘water’ while failing to apply it correctly is her 
history of causal relations to water (Davidson 2001a: 200). 
The crucial question is, if largely correct application is 
necessary for meaning something by a word, why does 
Davidson deny it is a norm? 
Perhaps the trouble is in speaking of words, rather than 
concepts. After having acquired a first language, surely we 
can refer to water by numerous words, just by being told 
that they all mean water. Similarly, a competent speaker 
could use any word, intending it to mean water, and still be 
understood by her hearer. In a sense, I ‘go on in the same 
way’ when referring to water by ‘water’ and ‘eau’, since 
both words have the same conditions of semantic 
correctness. But this does not render semantic correct-
ness, or awareness of its conditions, otiose: it is plausible 
to say that had I never managed to correctly apply ‘water’ 
to water, neither could I mean water by ‘eau’3; to mean 
something by a word, I must be able to think of and refer to 
whatever the word correctly applies to.  
But in fact, this is implicit in (D), which states that a 
speaker can mean green by ‘green’ only if she is justified 
in believing that she will be understood as meaning green. 
To see this, imagine a child who has been taught to use 
the word ‘cow’ by a person who is otherwise a competent 
speaker, but for some reason, completely unable to 
distinguish between cardboard-cows and real ones. If the 
child has been taught to utter ‘cow’ in the presence of real 
cows or Gettier-cows, then that is what her word ‘cow’ 
refers to. Let us say, in the metalanguage, that her ‘cow’ 
means cow*. Strictly speaking, then, such a speaker could 
not believe she will be understood as meaning cow by an 
utterance she makes.  
The modified suggestion concerning the normativity of 
semantically correct application above was that because a 
speaker can make mistakes and still mean cow by ‘cow’, it 
is enough that she should try to apply ‘cow’ to cows, or, 
perhaps, at least know what her words correctly apply to. 
But against (D), a norm stating how one can succeed to 
mean green by ‘green’ in terms of conditions of semantic 
correctness seems to be beset with circularity. Consider 
hypothetical norms of the form “To do x, one should do y”. 
For instance, to play chess, one should make moves that 
are legitimate by the rules of chess. These rules are 
constitutive of chess, but what is common to all such 
                                                     
3 Someone might interpret me as speaking of water, but I couldn’t intend to be 
understood as meaning water, since I wouldn’t know what water is. 




norms is that someone should be able to intend to or want 
to play chess even if not in command of these rules.4 
Similarly for a norm stating that to speak English, ‘water’ 
should be used to refer to water: intending to, or believing 
that one is speaking English, is a distinct activity from 
actually speaking English.  
But consider intending that some word or utterance ‘x’ 
means green, or using it to mean green. Against the above 
discussion of Davidson’s externalism, this presupposes 
knowing what ‘x’ correctly applies to, as well as a 
background of correctly speaking of and referring to green 
things. Because intending to and believing that one will be 
understood as meaning green by ‘green’ presupposes that 
that the speaker is aware of what it is for something to be 
green – the conditions of semantic correctness of her word 
– this cannot be a norm for meaning green by ‘green’. 
Failing in the intention to mean green by ‘green’ is distinct 
from failing to know what it is for something to be green.  
In asking what is essential for successful communica-
tion, Davidson’s starting point is to examine speakers who 
already, to some extent, ascribe to conditions of semantic 
correctness. If someone were to ask what is necessary for 
winning a game of chess, it would not be helpful to answer 
“following the rules of chess”, since following the rules of 
chess defines what a game of chess is – the rules are 
presupposed in the question. Trivially, following the rules 
correctly is a necessary condition for winning, but this is 
quite a different answer than saying that winning demands 
a sufficiently good game tactic. I have argued that if we 
accept (D), answering the question “What is essential or 
necessary for succeeding to mean green by ‘green’?” by 
appealing to a grasp of conditions of semantic correctness 
is just like telling someone that to win a game of chess, he 
should follow the rules of chess – that is, play chess and 
not some other game.  
                                                     
4 Whether a person who does not know the rules of chess can fully know what 
chess is is another question, but such a person can still have the intention of 
playing chess without knowing the rules, that is, an intention to play the game 
that is defined by the rules of chess, whatever these rules are.  
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